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Economic geography receives limited consideration in the venture capital literature.  This 
study utilizes thirty years of data concerning companies that initially were backed by 
venture capital.  These firms are located in Entrepreneurial Focal Points in the United 
States, namely: California, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas.  How 
well do these companies operate once they go public?  Do the scrutiny measures, 
expertise and financial backing that firms gain from the venture capitalists increase their 
annual and cumulative returns?  The results show that returns on investment are adequate 
given their substantial risk. 
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This paper uses thirty years of data concerning the venture capital industry, 
stratified by location, to investigate the annual and cumulative returns of companies 
located in the main centers of venture capital activities and which were initially backed 
by venture capitalists.  These entrepreneurs keep a stake in the companies once the 
companies go public.  How well do these companies operate once they go public?  Do the 
scrutiny measures, expertise and financial backing that firms gain from the venture 
capitalists increase their annual and cumulative returns? 
This paper shows that based on historical statistics, the total returns of these firms 
are reasonable given the level of risk involved in investment in these companies.  This is 
done by concentrating on the main centers of gravity as far as enterprises backed by 
venture capital funds.  These centers are located in the states of California, 
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.  The pioneering works of the 2008 
Nobel Laureate, Paul Krugman, who reintroduces economic geography to economics and 
finance, motivate this paper.  In his work Krugman begins from the observation that 
economic activity is not randomly uniformly distributed across space. 
A broadly held perception is that the required rates of return for investing in 
public companies that were backed by venture capitalists are high.  For example, the top 
performing active Californian firms in the data used in this study had an annual return of 
1,813 percent and the maximum cumulative return for one of the Californian firms is an 
incredible 35,621 percent during the period of the study.  Numbers similar to these   3
obscure the facts that there are many other companies which stop their operations all 
together and become inactive, or have significantly lower returns while active. 
The paper is organized into the following sections.  Section II presents a brief 
review of the literature while Section III describes the data.  Section IV presents the 
empirical findings for annualized and cumulative rates of return for all firms and for 
firms stratified as currently active or inactive for the states of California, Massachusetts, 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.  Section V concludes. 
II.  Review of the Literature 
 
Economic geography has moved to the forefront of research due to the works of 
the 2008 Nobel laureate, Paul Krugman, who was awarded the Prize for his “analysis of 
trade patterns and location of economic activity.”  Although economic geography is a 
focus of both international economists and industrial organization researchers, it has 
received limited consideration in the venture capital literature. 
In order to gain an understanding of economic geography, the study of location is 
essential.  The reemergence of economic geography theory can be attributed to the 
pioneering works of Krugman (1991A, 1991B, 1998), Fujita and Krugman (2004), and 
Venables (1996, 1998, 2003).  Bruno, Leidecker and Harder (1986) analyze patterns of 
failure among Silicon Valley High Technology Firms.  Midelfart, Overman, and 
Venables (2002) estimate a model of locations in different nations and Behrens (2005) 
investigates the relationship between industrial location patterns and market size. 
Returns of venture capital firms are studied by Murphy (1956), Poindexter (1976), 
Hoban (1976) Martin and Petty (1983), Ibbotson and Brinson (1987), Roberts and 
Stevenson (1992), Rich and Gumpert (1992), Bygrave and Timmons (1992), Timmons   4
(1999) and Venture Economics (1997).  The issues related to the questions of what 
motivate entrepreneurial activities have been studied by, among others, Constant and 
Shachmurove 2006; Constant, Shachmurove and Zimmermann 2007; and Kellman, Roxo 
and Shachmurove 2003.  Shachmurove (2007) relates entrepreneurial activities to 
innovations and international trade.  The venture capital industries are studied using 
survey data in Shachmurove (2001, 2006).  This paper uses actual data rather than survey 
data and concentrate on the entrepreneurial centers of gravity in the United States, 
namely the states of California, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
III. Data 
The data are from Securities Data Company Platinum 2.1, Venture Financing 
1968-2008, Thomson Financial Securities Data, and from Venture Economics 
Information Services, Venture Financing 1968 –2008.
1  The primary source for the data 
is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including EDGAR, the SEC's 
electronic database of corporate reports.  Thomson Financial Securities is a leading 
provider of real-time economic, technical and fundamental analysis of securities to clients 
globally via various screen services
2 (Kimelman, 1998).  This is one of the major 
                                                 
1  The exact references to the data are:  Securities Data Company Platinum 2.1, Venture Financing 1968 
2004, Thomson Financial Securities Data, 22 Thomson Place, Boston, MA 02210, and from Venture 
Economics Information Services, Venture Financing 1968 –2004, Newark, NJ 07102.  The primary source 
for the data is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including EDGAR, the SEC's electronic 
database of corporate reports. 
2 Venture Economics' Investor Services Group (VEIS) serves institutional investors by providing 
monitoring and benchmarking services for their private equity portfolios.  This includes the calculation and 
monitoring of performance of their private equity funds.  From these relationships as well as the 
relationships with the general parent community in the private equity industry fostered by 30 years of 
research and publication of the Venture Capital Journal, Buyouts, Investment Benchmarks and Pratts Guide 
to Venture Capital, VEIS has solicited and received cash flow information from over 1,000 private equity 
partnerships. 
   5
financial sources of accounting and financial data for researchers (Rocha and Kupfer, 
2002, and Bagnoli, Kross, and Watts, 2002).
3 
Venture Economics’ Investor Services Group (VEIS) serves institutional investors 
by providing monitoring and benchmarking services for their private equity portfolios.  
This includes the calculation and monitoring of performance of their private equity funds.  
From these relationships, as well as the relationships with the general parent community 
in the private equity industry fostered by 30 years of research and publication of the 
Venture Capital Journal, Buyouts, Investment Benchmarks and Pratts Guide to Venture 
Capital, VEIS has solicited and received cash flow information from over 1,000 private 
equity partnerships.  Over 700 of these partnerships are venture funds while over 250 are 
buyout and other private equity funds.  Bannock Consulting augmented this database 
with almost 300 European focused funds.  VEIS currently receives cash flow information 
on these funds from over 200 private equity management firms and over 40 investors. 
Weiner and Ulbricht (2005) systematically investigate and compare today's two 
major counterparts as a source of accounting and financial data:  Compustat North 
America by Standard & Poor's and Thomson Financial Data.  Their investigation is 
conducted for U.S. and partly Canadian data over an extensive period from 1985 to 2003.  
They examine more than 650 data items available in both databases and address the 
question of whether or not the decision for one or the other source may have an impact on 
the outcome of research projects.  It is probably assumed that this impact is minor, but it 
also leaves room to question certain results.  Weiner and Ulbricht (2005) show that the 
                                                 
3 Thomson provides data regarding the IPO price and shares, along with the initial investments into the 
company; Thomson also offers the split adjusted offer shares and size, along with annualized and 
cumulative return information between the IPO and the time in which the data is analyzed.   6
use of both databases lead to comparable results, except in few cases, e.g. when a size 
bias exists.  Furthermore, after 1998 the number of firms covered by Thomson Financial 
Data exceeds the one covered by Compustat by about one fourth.  Based on that criterion, 
this paper uses the Thomson Financial Securities Data, which enables the use of a 
sample, which is large enough to prove statistically significant. 
Bagnoli, Kross, and Watts (2002), uses the fact that managers of thousands of 
firms have voluntarily disclosed the expected date of their firm's next quarterly earnings 
announcement to Thomson Financial Data Services Inc.  They find that these disclosures 
are approximately 500% more accurate than the simple time-series expected report dates 
used in prior accounting research.  These disclosures are also informative.  On average, 
managers who miss their own expected date eventually report earnings that fall about one 
penny per share below consensus forecasts for each day of delay.  Investors respond by 
sending the price of late-announcing stocks down at the missed expected report date and 
continue to send them down as the reporting delay lengthens, consistent with this "day 
late, penny short" result. 
Schirm (2003) investigates the rationality of two survey forecasts of selective 
U.S. macroeconomic performance measures that were widely followed in the financial 
markets during the 1990-2000 period.  He compares the rationality of survey forecast 
data from Money Market Services, Inc., and Thomson Financial.  Schirm (2003) extends 
prior research that has evaluated the rationality of Money Market Services data for earlier 
time periods while also evaluating similar consensus forecast data from Thomson 
Financial Data that were widely reported in both Barron's and the Wall Street Journal   7
during the 1990s.  For our purposes, we find the Thomson Financial Data has a broader 
range of observations. 
The database includes information on both active and inactive corporations.   
Inactive companies are firms that were acquired or went out of business.  Although one 
may claim that this is a highly selective sub-sample, the reader is reminded that excluding 
them altogether or not reporting their returns will subject the analysis to selectivity bias, 
since the investor does not a priori knows which firm will become insolvent.  Thus, the 
paper presents the results for both active and inactive firms separately, as well as grouped 
together. 
  The unique database stratifies annual and cumulative returns for different 
locations.  We present here results from 1,697 firms in five states.  The classification of 
locations is into five states: California, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Texas.  The next five sub-sections presents the empirical results for the five states that are 
major centers of gravity for venture-capital backed firms. 
IV. Empirical  Results 
 
The next five sub-sections present the empirical results for the five states that are major 
centers of gravity for venture-capital backed firms.  The results are displayed for three 
categories.  The first one is all firms, both active and inactive firms.  The second and the 
third categories are for active and inactive firms, respectively.  Within each category, the 
annual and cumulative returns are given.  The rows in the tables show summary statistics 
and tests of significant of these statistics.  Below a summary of these statistics are 
discussed, while more detailed figures are available in the tables. 
   8
IV.1  Results for Annualized and Cumulative Returns for Firms in California 
 
Table 1 presents the results for the firms in California.  There are 956 firms from 
1969 to 2004.  Out of these 956 Californian start-ups, 496 were active while 460 were 
inactive firms at the end of the sample period.  Some noteworthy statistics are revealed by 
the data.  Venture-capital backed firms in California over this time period had negative 
annual returns (-43.3 percent).  The cumulative return for all firms in California, which is 
about 59 percent, is not statistically significantly different from zero.  As one expects, 
active Californian firms perform better than inactive ones.  Active firms had an annual 
mean return of -9.7 percent and a cumulative mean return of 181 percent, while inactive 
firms have annual and cumulative returns of -80 percent and of -73 percent, respectively.  
When testing for the null hypotheses of annual and cumulative means equal to zero for 
California, both active and inactive firms have annual and cumulative returns that are 
statistically different from zero.  Note that all estimated coefficients above are statically 
significant except for cumulative returns of all firms as mentioned above. 
The median annual and cumulative returns for all Californian firms, whether 
active or inactive, are negative.  The median annualized and cumulative returns for 
inactive firms is -100 percent, in other words, the entire capital of these companies is 
completely wiped out.  For active firms, the median of annualized and cumulative returns 
are both negative with -12 percent and -43 percent, respectively.  Furthermore, seventy-
five percent of the inactive firms still had annual and cumulative returns of -100% while 
active firms have an annual return of 9.925% and a cumulative return of 82.275%.  Note 
that the standard deviation is much greater for active compared to inactive firms.  The top   9
performing active Californian firms had an annual return of 1,813 percent and a 
cumulative return of 35,621 percent. 
The standard deviation of annual return of active Californian firms is 124 percent 
compared to the 42 percent for inactive firms.  The standard deviation for the cumulative 
returns of active firms is an astounding 1,689 percent compared to the 109 percent for 
inactive firms.  Not surprisingly, the top five companies ranked by their annual as well as 
their cumulative returns show that active firms perform much better than inactive firms 
do.  Furthermore, the range is huge for the active firms whereas the corresponding value 
for the inactive firms is much smaller (1.913 percent versus 295 percent for annualized 
returns and 35,721 percent versus 1,465 percent for cumulative returns). 
IV.2  Results for Annualized and Cumulative Returns for Firms in Massachusetts 
 
Table 2 presents the results for the Massachusetts based firms.  The data for the 
state of Massachusetts consists of 292 firms from 1969 to 2004.  Out of these 292 
Massachusetts start-ups, 140 were active while 152 were inactive firms at the end of the 
sample period.  Annually, all venture-capital backed firms in Massachusetts over this 
time period had negative annual return (-47.9 percent).  As one expects, active 
Massachusetts firms perform better than inactive ones, although providing negative 
returns of negative 13 percent and a cumulative return of positive 67 percent.  Inactive 
firms had annual and cumulative returns of -80 percent and -75 percent, respectively.  
When testing for the null hypotheses of cumulative mean equal to zero, both active and 
inactive firms have cumulative returns that are statistically different from zero.  However, 
the null hypotheses of zero cumulative returns for all firms surveyed in Massachusetts 
cannot be rejected.   10
The median annual return and median cumulative return for all Massachusetts 
firms whether active or inactive are negative.  The median annualized and cumulative 
returns for inactive firms are negative 100 percent.  In other words, the entire capital 
investments of these companies are completely wiped out.  For active firms, the median 
annualized and cumulative returns are both negative with -7 percent and -26 percent, 
respectively.  Furthermore, seventy-five percent of the inactive firms have annual and 
cumulative returns of -100 percent while active firms have an annual return of 12 percent 
and a cumulative return of 90 percent.  The top performing active Massachusetts firms 
had annual and cumulative returns of 174 percent and, and astonishingly 2,540 percent, 
respectively. 
The standard deviation of annual return of active Massachusetts firms is 5 percent 
compared to the 26 percent for inactive firms.  The standard deviation for the cumulative 
returns of active firms is 309 percent compared to the 92 percent for inactive firms.  This 
is an indicator of how risky the active firms are.  The top five companies ranked by their 
annual as well as their cumulative returns show that active firms perform better than 
inactive firms.  Interestingly, the performances of the top inactive firms are high for both 
annual and cumulative returns.  The range is larger for the annualized returns of inactive 
firms compared to active firms (319 percent versus 274 percent for annualized returns) 
whereas the range is smaller for the cumulative returns of inactive firms when compared 
to active firms (758 percent versus 2,640 percent for cumulative returns).  This is again 
an indicator of how risky the active firms are and the potential to some to become 
inactive firms. 
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IV.3 Results for Annualized and Cumulative Returns for Firms in New York 
 
Table 3 presents the results for the firms in New York.  There are 165 firms from 
1969 to 2004.  There are 79 active firms and the 86 firms are inactive firms.  Annually, 
all venture-backed firms in New York over this period have statistically significant mean 
negative annual returns (-53.8 percent).  However, the cumulative return for all firms is 
not statistically different than zero.  The mean annual return for active firms is negative 
13 percent and a mean cumulative return of 78 percent while inactive firms have an 
annual return of -91 percent and a cumulative return of -94 percent.  When testing for the 
null hypotheses of cumulative mean equal to zero for the state of New York, both active 
and inactive firms have cumulative returns that is statistically different than zero.   
However, the null hypotheses of zero returns for all firms surveyed in New York cannot 
be rejected. 
The median annual return and median cumulative return for all New York firms 
whether they are active or inactive are negative.  The median annualized and cumulative 
returns for inactive firms is -100 percent while active firms perform better with an active 
annual return of –5 percent and a cumulative return of about 38 percent.  Seventy-five 
percent of inactive firms still have annual and cumulative returns of negative 100 percent, 
while active firms have an annual return of 8 percent and a cumulative return of 88 
percent.  The top performing New York firm has annual and cumulative returns of 742 
percent and 2,078 percent, respectively. 
Active firms have greater standard deviation compared to inactive firms.  The 
standard deviation of annual return of active firms is 113 percent compared to the 25 
percent for inactive firms.  The standard deviation for the cumulative returns of active   12
firms is 256 percent compared to 20 percent for inactive companies.  The top five firms 
ranked by their annual as well as their cumulative returns show that active firms perform 
better than inactive firms.  The range-statistic is high for the active firms whereas the 
corresponding value for the inactive firms is much smaller (842 percent versus 100 
percent for annualized returns and 2,178 percent versus 103 percent for cumulative 
returns). 
IV.4 Results for Annualized and Cumulative Returns for Firms in Pennsylvania 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the firms in Pennsylvania.  There are 87 firms that 
were backed by venture capital from 1969 to 2004.  There are 43 active and 44 inactive 
firms.  All firms in Pennsylvania over this time period had negative annual returns of 
about -47 percent.  The cumulative return for all firms in Pennsylvania, which is about 
31.7 percent, is not statistically significant.  Active Pennsylvanian firms perform better 
than inactive with mean annual return of -22 percent and a cumulative return of 107 
percent, while inactive firms are both negative, with an annual return of -71 percent and a 
cumulative return of -42 percent.  When testing for the null hypotheses of mean 
cumulative return equals to zero, active firms have cumulative returns that is statistically 
different than zero.  However, the null hypotheses of zero returns for all the firms and for 
inactive firms in Pennsylvania cannot be rejected. 
The medians for annual and cumulative returns for all Pennsylvanian firms 
whether they are active or inactive are all negative.  The medians for annualized and 
cumulative returns for inactive firms are -100 percent while active firms have an annual 
return of –13 percent and a cumulative return of -36.5 percent.  Seventy-five percent of 
inactive firms have annual and cumulative returns of -37 percent and -86 percent,   13
respectively, while active firms have an annual return of 12 percent and a cumulative 
return of 110 percent.  These figures indicate how risky these corporations are.  On the 
other side of the spectrum, the highest performing Pennsylvanian firm has annual returns 
of 98 percent and cumulative returns of 1,807 percent. 
The standard deviation of annual return of active Pennsylvanian firms is 52 
percent compared to the 49 percent for inactive firms.  The standard deviation for the 
cumulative returns of active firms is 368 percent compared to the 188 percent for inactive 
firms.  The ranges for both annual and cumulative returns for active firms are higher than 
the corresponding statistics for inactive firms (198 percent versus 174 percent for 
annualized returns and 1907 percent versus 1068 percent for cumulative returns). 
IV.5 Results for Annualized and Cumulative Returns for Firms in Texas 
 
Table 5 presents the results for the firms in Texas.  There are 197 venture-backed 
firms from 1969 to 2004, 88 active and 109 inactive firms.  The mean annual return for 
all firms is negative 51.6 percent.  The cumulative return is not statistically different from 
zero.  Active Texan firms have mean annual return of -8 percent and a cumulative return 
of 234 percent while inactive firms had an annual return of -87 percent and a cumulative 
return of -75 percent.  When testing for the null hypotheses of cumulative mean equal to 
zero, both active and inactive firms have cumulative returns that are statistically different 
than zero.  However, the null hypotheses of zero returns for all the firms surveyed in 
Texas cannot be rejected. 
The medians of annual and cumulative returns for active Texan firms are positive 
at 0.6 percent and 1.2 percent while those for inactive firms are at negative -100 percent.  
Moreover, seventy-five percent of inactive firms have annual and cumulative returns of   14
negative 100 percent, while active firms have an annual return of 13 percent and a 
cumulative return of 132 percent.  The top performing active Texan firm has annual and 
cumulative returns of 150 percent and 11,000 percent, respectively. 
The standard deviation of annual return of active Texan firms is 51 percent 
compared to the 34 percent for inactive firms.  The standard deviation for the cumulative 
returns of active firms is 1,231 percent as compared to the relatively low number of 128 
percent for inactive firms.  The range is high for the active firms whereas the value for 
the inactive firms is smaller (250 percent versus 162 percent for annualized returns and 
11,100 percent versus 1,235 percent for the cumulative returns). 
V. Conclusion 
 
This study uses a unique database to stratify thirty years of data, from 1969 to 
2004.  The database includes 1,697 companies, which were backed by the venture capital 
industry.  There are 846 active and 851 inactive firms.  For each firm, the annual and 
cumulative returns are used to generate descriptive and inferential statistics.  The data 
have been grouped into the major states of the United States.  These states serve as the 
center of gravity and as a hub to venture capital investment in the United States.  The 
states are California, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.  The paper 
refutes the assertion that the rates of returns for firms, which were backed by venture 
capital, are high.  The paper demonstrates that returns on investment are in line with the 
risks associated with such firms.  In this respect, the paper is another confirmation that 
financial markets are efficient. 
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Table 1: Annualized and Cumulative Returns for California     
   All  Active  Inactive 
    Annual Cumulative Annual Cumulative  Annual  Cumulative 
    Return Return Return Return  Return  Return 
N  956 956 496 496 460  460
Mean  -43.30 58.86 -9.67 181.27 -79.57  -73.14
Std Dev  100.15 1224.88 123.78 1688.90 42.47 108.70
Skewness  8.53 26.04 7.92 18.98 2.39 8.60
CV  -2.31 20.81 -12.80 9.32 -0.53 -1.49
T:Mean=0  -13.37 1.49 -1.74 2.39 -40.18  -14.43
Kurtosis  132.23 747.17 100.22 394.17 6.53 95.57
Std Mean  3.24 39.62 5.56 75.83 1.98 5.07
Pr>|T|  0.00 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.00  0.00
100% Max  1813.3 35621 1813.3 35621 195  1365.4
75% Q3  -3.08 -11.05 9.93 82.28 -100.00  -100.00
50% Med  -91.95 -100 -12.05 -42.7 -100  -100
25% Q1  -100 -100 -100 -100 -100  -100
Range  1913.3 35721 1913.3 35721 295  1465.4
Q3-Q1  96.925 88.95 109.93 182.28 0  0
0.99  307.77 1615.11 468.30 2956.80 77.41 304.45
0.95  53.38 474.48 96.08 724.40 11.51 79.04
0.9  24.85 170.3 43.75 411.25 -13.78 -46.5
Max -1  718.1 5962.5 718.1 5962.5 103.2  1076.2
Table 2: Annualized and Cumulative Returns for Massachusetts   
   All  Active  Inactive 
    Annual Cumulative  Annual Cumulative  Annual  Cumulative 
    Return Return  Return Return  Return  Return 
N  292 292 140 140 152  152
Mean  -47.85 -6.87 -13.32 67.03 -79.66  -74.94
Std Dev  58.96 235.05 53.88 309.60 43.62  92.28
Skewness  1.06 6.49 0.46 5.17 3.05  5.65
CV  -1.23 -34.22 -4.05 4.62 -0.55  -1.23
T:Mean=0  -13.87 -0.50 -2.92 2.56 -22.52  -10.01
Kurtosis  1.59 57.67 1.68 34.46 14.11  36.05
Std Mean  3.45 13.76 4.55 26.17 3.54  7.49
Pr>|T|  0.00 0.62 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.00
100% Max  219.3 2540 173.8 2540 219.3  658.3
75% Q3  -1.87 -11.57 11.17 90.27 -100  -100
50% Med  -57.2 -94.85 -6.95 -25.65 -100  -100
25% Q1  -100 -100 -31.95 -83.575 -100  -100
Range  319.3 2640 273.8 2640 319.3  758.3
Q3-Q1  98.13 88.43 43.13 173.85 0.00  0.00
0.99  148.88 787.33 155.12 1429.18 29.42  382.46
0.95  29.80 348.19 72.89 478.38 2.00  15.29
0.9  16.06 157.47 27.55 259.67 -11.03 -49.73
Max -1  173.8 1709.4 159.8 1709.4 30.9  471.3
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Table 3: Annualized and Cumulative Returns for New York   
   All  Active  Inactive 
   Annual  Cumulative  Annual  Cumulative  Annual  Cumulative
   Return  Return  Return  Return  Return  Return 
N  165 165 79 79 86  86
Mean  -53.84 -11.53 -13.23 77.91 -91.14 -93.68
Std Dev  89.18 256.03 113.39 349.05 24.65  20.45
Skewness  5.34 5.97 4.44 4.23 2.73 3.53
CV  -1.66 -22.21 -8.57 4.48 -0.27  -0.22
T:Mean=0  -7.75 -0.58 -1.04 1.98 -34.29  -42.49
Kurtosis  41.72 42.54 26.82 20.78 6.29 12.34
Std Mean  6.94 19.93 12.76 39.27 2.66  2.20
Pr>|T|       0.00             0.00       0.00              0.00       0.00             0.00  
100% Max  742.2 2077.8 742.2 2077.8 0.4  2.5
75% Q3  -4.9 -33.6 7.9 87.55 -100  -100
50% Med  -100 -100 -4.9 -37.5 -100 -100
25% Q1  -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
Range  842.2 2177.8 842.2 2177.8 100.4  102.5
Q3-Q1  95.1 66.4 107.9 187.55 0  0
0.99  225.44 1131.94 476.45 1880.46 0.23  2.42
0.95  29.2 347.38 84.22 426.97 -26.675 -43.85
0.9  9.52 108.72 31.7 358.64 -53.15  -86
Max -1  401.5 1824.8 401.5 1824.8 0.2  2.4
 
Table 4: Annualized and Cumulative Returns for Pennsylvania   
   All  Active  Inactive 
   Annual  Cumulative  Annual  Cumulative  Annual  Cumulative
   Return  Return  Return  Return  Return  Return 
N  87 87 43 43 44 44
Mean  -46.96 31.74 -22.36 106.68 -71.00  -41.49
Std Dev  55.86 298.93 51.87 367.99 49.15 188.03
Skewness  0.49 3.66 -0.14 3.04 1.46 4.47
CV  -1.19 9.42 -2.32 3.45 -0.69  -4.53
T:Mean=0  -7.84 0.99 -2.83 1.90 -9.58  -1.46
Kurtosis  -0.93 15.90 -0.40 10.74 1.00 21.35
Std Mean  5.99 32.05 7.91 56.12 7.41 28.35
Pr>|T|  0.00 0.32 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.15
100% Max  97.9 1807.1 97.9 1807.1 74.1  967.9
75% Q3  1.9 23.25 12.25 110.15 -36.975  -86.25
50% Med  -51.6 -96.8 -13 -36.5 -100  -100
25% Q1  -100 -100 -53.65 -97.55 -100 -100
Range  197.9 1907.1 197.9 1907.1 174.1 1067.9
Q3-Q1  101.9 123.25 65.9 207.7 63.025  13.75
0.99  85.09 1085.39 91.64 1426.62 65.67  780.81
0.95  38.14 727.89 39.18 813.72 15.76 103.09
0.9  16.3 188.06 23.22 520.24 1.34  49.52
Max -1  83 967.9 83 901.2 54.5 532.8
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Table 5: Annualized and Cumulative Returns for Texas 
   All  Active  Inactive 
   Annual  Cumulative  Annual  Cumulative  Annual  Cumulative
   Return  Return  Return  Return  Return  Return 
N  197 197 88 88 109  109
Mean  -51.59 63.16 -7.84 233.71 -86.90  -74.53
Std Dev  57.84 839.65 50.83 1230.71 34.22  128.48
Skewness  0.77 11.71 -0.04 8.05 2.54 8.18
CV  -1.12 13.29 -6.48 5.27 -0.39 -1.72
T:Mean=0  -12.52 1.06 -1.45 1.78 -26.51  -6.06
Kurtosis  -0.30 149.57 1.02 69.50 5.41 74.57
Std Mean  4.12 59.82 5.42 131.19 3.28  12.31
Pr>|T|  0.00 0.29 0.15 0.08 0.00  0.00
100% Max  149.7 11000 149.7 11000 62.2 1135
75% Q3  0.6 1.8 12.65 131.88 -100  -100
50% Med  -100 -100 0.55 1.15 -100  -100
25% Q1  -100 -100 -25.03 -68.98 -100  -100
Range  249.7 11100 249.7 11100 162.2 1235
Q3-Q1  100.60 101.80 37.68 200.85 0.00  0.00
0.99  111.19 1221.60 126.38 4301.00 23.09 245.54
0.95  40.42 450.88 67.19 696.66 -1.16 15.30
0.9  15.6 243.88 40.53 451.32 -22.2 -65.32
Max -1  122.9 3300 122.9 3300 23.8  245.8
 